Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications

Philosophy, Department of

1-1-2015

The Philosophy of the Marburg School: From the
Critique of Scientific Cognition to the Philosophy
of Culture
Sebastian Luft
Marquette University, sebastian.luft@marquette.edu

Published version. "The Philosophy of the Marburg School: From the Critique of Scientific
Cognition to the Philosophy of Culture," in New Approaches to Neo-Kantianism. Eds. Nicolas de
Warren and Andrea Staiti. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015: 221-239. Publisher link. ©
2015 Cambridge University Press. Used with permission.

C HAP TE R I I

The philosophy ofthe Marburg School: from
the critique ofscientific cognition
to the philosophy ofculture
Sebastian Luft

Introduction
The Marburg School ofNeo-Kantianism is, besides the Southwest School,
the most widely known and most influential school formation to emerge
within the broad movement of Neo-Kanrianism in the latter third of the
nineteenth century.' T he school consisted of the twin stars H ermann
Cohen (1842-1918) and Paul Narorp (1854-1924), with the younger Ernst
Cassirer (1874- 1945) as their satellite. Perhaps more than in any other
philosophical grouping, the term "school " used to designate this cluster
of philosophers merits arrention. For its core members insisted that their
project consists, essentially, of a un ified weltanschaulich outlook on life
whose basic commjrmenrs its fo llowers must share. This was the manner in
wh ich the school was organized by its founders and by which they granted
entrance to novices. As a tigh tly knit philosophical com munity, it has
become paradigmatic for oth er gro upings in rhe twentieth century, such as
the Phenomenological Movement, the Vienna C ircle or the Frankfurt
Sch ool, who all tried, despite thei r own tendencies, to emulate rhis "school
spirit."
Yet, rhe core tenets of this school are for the most part misrepresented.
T h is is nor surprising given the plethora of their writings and the lack of a
real "manifesto. "2 The conrours of an overarching vision can o nly be
gleaned through an overview of the publications stemming from the
' To deAcet po5Sible criricism from Lhe sran, when I speak of" the ~larburg School," I mean essenrially
Hermann Cohen, Paul Nawrp, and Ernst Cassirer, and I exclude other philosophers working ar the
Unh•ersity of Marburg, such :u Nicolai Harrmann or Hans-Gcorg Gadamer, who wrote his
d.issertation under Natorp.
• Narorp's shorr Phj}qsophir (Natorp 1oo8l can serve as an inrroducrion to the main aims of rhe
Marburg School. However. published in 1911, it comes rather late in the life of the school and at a
rime in Natorp's life when his own paradigms had begun to shift.
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M arburg School, and not just irs most popular writings, which lie in the
philosophy of science. Given the predominant recep£ion of the writings in
this area, to introduce the philosophical principles and intentions diiving
rhe Marburg School, one has to confront a widespread misunderstanding
head-on. In most presentations, the (Neo-)Kantianism of the Marburg
School is treated as a narrowed form of Kanr's philosophy. Allegedly,
it reduces Kant's rranscenden tal philosophy ro a theory of naturalmathematical science, thereby relegating philosophy to a "handmaiden
of the sciences." Kant's critical system becomes whittled down to an
epistemology of natural-scientific cognition. A main concern in presenting
this school must be a rejection of dtis erroneous reading, which is understandable only in light of the writings that were most widely read.
While it is true char the theory of scientific cognition the Marbw gers
formuJated is an important aspect of this school, it would be misleading to
see their main intentions exhausted in a theory of science. Instead, the main
intention of this school was from the outset a broadening of the crit ique,
both in method as well as scope. FormuJaically, "the critique of reason
becomes the cri tique of culture, .. as Cassi rer announces in the first volume
of his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms in 1923 (Cassirer 1954: r: rr). Bur it is
moscly overlooked that when Cassirer issues this "battle cry," he m erely
repeats the semimenr that inspires the school as a whole, starting from
Cohen and Narorp. Such a critique, however, cannot do without a look at
the effort of the sciences that work on different aspects of cuJtural Life. As
Narorp emphasizes, what is sought is "a truth which, armored with the
impenetrable steel of the most genuine, most durable science, should ar the
same time be fit to satisfy not calculating reason, burro answer co the most
secret, innermost doubts and questions of the soul" (Natorp 2008: 22) . ~
T h is concept of science is the target of critidsms that claim char science is
an alienation From life and that culture is nothing bur the indifferent field
of inauthentic existence.
T o sketch a grand vision of clhis school is the cask of this chapter. The
school's scope is, in effect, so great chat it goes beyond that of Kant's
architectonics, such that che designation "Neo-Kantian" is inadequate. lt is
no exaggeration to say that this school presents one of the most encompassing phjlosophical visions to arise in the tradition of classical German
philosophy. Having modified and updated Kant's critical philosophy,
having taken in Hegel's philosophy and the dimension of the hisrorical,
having wirnessed the dominance of scientific positivism in the latter half of
' Al l quot~tions from the German original arc rranslated by rh~ author.
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the nineteenth cenrury, and having observed other Neo-Kamian tendencies attempting ro cou nter the dominance of such a positivism, the
Marburg School, in the late Cassirer, self-co nsciously situates itself
between Kant and H egel. It is one of the last great syn thesizing attempts
in the Enlightenment tradi tion before the advent of posrmodernism. But,
as contemporary thought has moved beyond such a radical stance, there are
reasons ro believe that there will be more sympathy for this "Marburg
vision" roday. h has che power to rival or complement other attempts char
consider modernism an "unfinished project" rather chan a quaint dream
that is amgetriiumt.
As these preliminary reflections make clear, I treat rhe Marburg School
as a unified phUosophical vision . This is not ro say that all members agreed
on every aspect. H ence, it will be necessary to trace the steps that led, first,
from Kant to Cohen , who laid out the first systematic position that defined
the Marburg School. Yet, both Narorp and Cassirer were dissatisfied wich
Cohen's position che moment it went beyond a philosophical justification
of the exact sciences. The subtle moves on the part of Natorp away from
Cohen are a story of their own,4 though Natorp remained in strong
outward uniry with Cohen. This "closing of ranks" is explicable only
through rhe intellectual and political landscape of the rime. Cassirer,
who never lived in M arburg and was, for that reason, o ften not considered
part of this school , was unconcerned with such political games and
expanded Cohen's scope, while remaining within the general framework
of the Marburg School. Thus, rhe full-blown shape of t he Marburg School
as a philosophy of cuhure can be seen in Cassi rer.
Hence, in the first section of this chapter, l discuss the general framework ofKanr's question as ro the conditio ns of the possibiliry of synthetic
a priori cognition and how it rakes on the concrete task of philosophical
work with respect to the existi ng factum of the sciences. The latter is the
starring point for the Marburgers. T o repeat, the most important aspect of
their philosophical efforts is their expansion of Kant's critique of reason
into a critique of culture. A critiq ue of scientific culrure is bur the beginning. Bur, ro understand this transformation of the Kantian project into
that of Marburg Neo-Kantianism, l discuss some key moves chat occurred
in Cohen in order to bring about this novel project. ln the second section, I
will trace the move from Cohen's "critical" idealism to Cassirer's

4

S« the s~minal srudy by H . Holzhcy. Col!m tmd Nnwrp. 1 vols. (Basel and S tuttgart: Schw.t~. 1986),
who deta ils the philosophy of Cohen and Narorp both in their collaborarion as well as in thei r
differences (i ncl uding a great a mount of a rch ival m aterial).
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"symbolic" idealism. Here, too, f confine myself ro the main moves
occurring in Cassirer in order co reconstruct his philosophy of the
symbolic. ln rhe third secrion, I will unfold the full-blown philosophy of
culture as it is laid out in Cassirer's Philosophy ofSymbolic Forms, including
his teleological vision for humankind. ln a conclusion , I will spell our whar
I believe could be the legacy of the Marburg School for contemporary
effons in philosophy and culture writ large. T his legacy has lived on , in
peculiar ways, in "N eo-Neo-Kantians," bur it has been forgotten that ir
Aourished in Marburg a century ago.
From transcenden tal to critical idealism : the factum
of the sciences
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is an exercise in theoretical philosophy
(epistemology) and in rhis function an investigation into rhe nature,
capacity, and limits of knowledge. Kant also dubs chis investigation a
"tractate on method" since the task of critique involves concrete steps to
establish the fac t that we have true cognition. "Real" rational cognition is,
as Kanr is proud co have discovered, synthetic a priori, as our reason is
capable of expanding our knowledge wi thour rhe aid of experience. Hence,
the task Kant sets for himself is ro establish how this cognition comes
abour. In the Firs t C ritique, this presentation is synthetic, in rhar Kant
presents step by step the contributions of the two seems of knowledge,
sensibility and understanding. T he possibility of sensibili ty is explained,
in rhe Aesthetics, through the doctrine of space and time as forms of
intuition. The Analytic discu sses the manner in which the undersrandj ng
applies concepts (categories of pure reason) ro intuitio ns. The crucial step
beyond an explanation of chis fact (quid focu) is the questio n as to how we
are justified in making a priori claims abou t objects of experience (quid
jactt) . In the Prolegomena, however, Kant opts for a different manner of
presentation, the analytic one, starting our from the factum of existing
cognition and inquiring into the conditions of the possibility of its comingabout. Both manners of presentation supposedly reach the same desired
goal; their difference is merely heuristic.
lr is the analytic path of the critique that the Marburgers preferred. The
reason for chis is the acknowledgment of the factum of synthetic a priori
cognition, nor as it is established in rhe abstract, bur as it is applied in the
mathematical exact sciences. As factum , as the result of the process of being
made (focere) by scien tific thought, it is ro be explained as already existing.
The working our of rhisfoctttm was carried our in what Cohen calls Kant's
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"transcendental method," a term that would become the method of rhe
Marburg School, though this phrase is nor found in Kane. One of Cohen's
key interpretive claims regarding Kant's philosophy was, accordingly, char
"the transcendental method was conceived in a meditation on Newton 's
Philosophiae Natura/is Principia Mathematica" (Cohen 1987: 94). For
Cohen, Kant's achievement lay no t so much in the abstract possibiJiry of
synthetic a priori cognition; instead, th.is achievement was fueled by the
fasci nation that this type of cognition was being obtained in mathematical
natural scien ces, insofar as mathematics is applied to nature, thereby
enabling and effectively creating a priori cognition. How chis was possible
and how ro justify this fact was, according to Cohen, Kant's main concern.
H ence, the factum of reason in rhe abstract was concretely worked our in
rhe factum of science (das Faktum der Wissmschaft). This insight is nor
Kant's discovery, however, bur a restatement of the Western tradition.
The factum of science is the key ro understanding the Western project of
philosophy, to Cohen, and Kant merely took up this tluead that began
with Plato, who placed philosophy on the secure foundation of science.
This entire tradition can only be adequately appreciated when seen
through the prism of the constant proximity of ph.ilosophy and science
beginning with Plato's idealism, w hich is "the methodological generaror of
science" (Cohen 1987: xvii ). Science, however, is an ongoing process by
which thought, through the produccion of new ideas and hypotheses,
conquers reality. What reality is can only be o btained under this assumption, rhar we can onJy comprehend what we, as Kant defines transcendental idealism, "lay inro rhings" through our reason. H ence, rhe
connection between science and philosophy as idealism is a necessary one:
The factum of science is rhe basic assumption rhar philosophy makes and
wirhour which it cannot begin. Therefore, this factum is nor dogmatically assumed bur is rather rhe methodological presupposition. If all
thinking, as production of ideas. unfolds and constructs itself in hypotheses, then it is necessary ro understand as the first hypothesis: rhar of
science itself. (Cohen 1987: 41)

Thus, while scientific progress is o ngoing, what remains constant is the
production of hypotheses, which are confirmed or fals ified. In this acdviry,
the sciences are in effect idealistic, as they bring, in broad generali ty, real ity
under ideas (concepts, theories). Only then can one truly speak of experience of reality. Cohen's original reading of Kant's Theory ofE-<perience (the
ride of his first work on Kant), in his attempt to "lay a new ground for the
Kanrian doctrine of the a priori" (Cohen 1987: ix), is d1at rhe experience
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Kant means is me experience on the part of the scientist, when she
conceives the numbers and laws under which nature stands. This is an
o ngoing activity of thought, nor in the generational sequence of researchers, bur in terms of rhe logical content of the scientific achievements
(Cohen is a fierce enemy of a psychologistic reading of scientific progress).
The factum is, as Narorp says, a fieri, someth ing being made, a making on
th e part of thinking su bjects with regard to the logical progress (Natorp
2013: 39) . As fieri, this progress is never-ending. Reality as fully logically
penetrated is the unatta inable " rhing in itself."
Looking back ar Kant's rranscendentaJ idealism , what has thus
happened here? Transcendental ideaJism is the claim that we unde rtake
rhe Copernican experiment to view objects insofar as they conform ro our
cognitive capacities and rhar we never experience the thing in itself bur
aJways only insofar as it appears ro us. ln the Marburg reading, modern
natural science is already enacting this ideaJism , unbeknownst ro itself.
The phe nomena that science ascertains are rhe laws of nature that we
impose based on our reason. Philosophy, then , has no task of its own, it
can have no territory of its own where it can perform itssuigeneris work. All
it can do is reconstruct the work in t he sciences, nor attempt ro do
so mething over and beyond ir. lt is, thus, a critique of the factum of the
sciences; the c ritique is a critique of reason as it is enacted in scientific
progress. As such, Cohen conceives transcendental idealism as critical
ideaJism with the express purpose of critiquing thought as it becomes
enacted in the sciences. This confirms the close tie between philosophy
and science that is the signature of Western thought. Kant merely brought
this insight to rhe clearest expression.
How does philosophy do this, concre tely? What remains as the task of
philosoph y (the "uanscendenral method")? Cohen describes the latter
thus:
C ritique, rhus, means first and foremost the warning: not to identifY or
place on equal footing philosophy with mathematics or natural science.
Philosophy's task is nor to create things or - as the seductive and infamous
saying goes, borrowed from mathematics - to 'construct' them, but instead
merely to understand and to test how the objens and laws of mathematical
experience are constituted. Bur the critique yields, along with chis warning,
ar che same time the insight and the consolacion that mathematical natural
science does not merely rest on mathematics and experience, bur itself
partakes in philosophy. The critique reaches to see and explore chis partaking, and the philosopher exploring this feels in rhe object of his critique the
spirit of his own spirit. (Cohen 1987= 73 ¥".)
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What happens now with one of the central demands of Kant, the establishmenc of a priori cognition, if science is an ongoing process that never ends?
Did not Kant claim to have discovered the totality of categories and the
principles by which we apply the former co nature? Here we find what is
perhaps the most original idea developed by the Marburg School. If science
is an ongoing process, then the original catego ries char Kant discerns wiU not
suffice for the purpose of giving expression to rational cognition. Bur the
option of simply dropping the demand of a priori cognition cannot simply
be accepted , since this would open the door to relativism. The solution can
only be to reconceive che a priori. As Cohen states, "new problems will require
new presuppositions. The necessary idea of the progress in science has as a
necessary presupposition . .. the idea of che progress ofpure cognitions" (Cohen
1977: 396). The a priori becomes, thus, dynamic, 5 insofar as new insighcs
require new concepts that are necessary for the time being bur which can be
modified or expanded (or perhaps rendered obsolete) as the progress ensues.
This is the attempt co reconcile the claim to objective knowledge with the
dynamic progress of scienrific cognition, which is rational, not merely
empirical. As Cassirer states:
The "facr" of science is and will of course remain in irs nature a hismrically
developing facr. If in Kanr this insight does nor yet appear explicitly, if his
categories can still appear as finished "core concepts of reason" in number
and conrenr, then the modern developmenr of critical and idealistic logic
[i.e., Cohen] has made this point perfectly clear. The formJ ofjudgment
mean for it the unified and active motivations of thought, which course
through rhe manifold of its particuJar formations and are conrinuaUy pur ro
use in the generation and formulation of new categories. (Cassirer 1994a: 18)

In Cassirer's rendition of this concept, one can distinguish, more precisely,
cwo levels of a priori, a strict and a dynamic one, as he says in a letter to
Schlick:
I would call "a priori" in rhe stricr sense merely the idea of"unity of namre,"
that is, of the lawfulness of experience as such or perhaps. more concisely,
the "distinctness of attribution" [Eintkutigktit der Zuordmmg] . .. But this
principle of distinctness irselfis, to me, indeed, more than just a "convention" or an "inducrive generalization": it is, tO me, an expression of" reason,"
of Logos itself. (Cas.sirer 2009a: 5o-51, from October 2.3, 1920)

Beyond the strict sense of 11 priori, there is a dynamically evolving web of
concepts char are necessary for a given phenomenon a nd for rhe rime being,
• On Lhis conception and its defense see M. Friedman , Tht Dynamics of R~IJJOII (Srmford: CSLI
Publications, 2001).
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the "very best bets" we have at a given time, with the knowledge that we
might have better or different hers at a later stage of scientific development.
This conception of the a priori retains the uanscendenral nature of Kane's
philosophy (necessary conditions of possibility of cognition), while
acknowledging that science makes progress and ever-expands its boundaries. The idea of scien ti6c progress is, however, purely "logical," concerning the progress of rational cognition, not a matter of em pirical discovery.
But to the Marburgers, new empirical discoveries are only then real
("experienced") when they are understood rationally. Everything else
would be a fallback into a naive realism that purports tO be in touch with
the "things themselves."
Now if cogn ition can only be acrained in the sciences, what is left for
philosophy to do other than co "attesr to" (beglaubigm) the latter, as Cohen
interpretS the justificatory aspect of critique? At this point the cririque of
philosophy as the "handmaiden of the sciences" seems to srick. Can
philosophy do anything but "follow carryi ng the train of lady science"
(Cassirer 2004: 358)? And if so, does this not mean that philosophy as a
discipline of irs own has become obsolere? The Marburgers were, of course,
well aware of this reproach. I wiU rerum to this poi or in the conclusion. For
now, we can utiliz.e rhe proximity between philosophy and science to set
out the broad lines of the Marburg School, returning to the project of a
philosophy of culture.
Critical idealism is most carefully worked out in Cohen 's theory of
scientific cognition. But, according to the original intention, the uanscendental method should be put to work in all areas of cuJrure. C ultme is
defined as "the entire work of humanity in which the latter produces and
forms ever higher [hinaufbildn] what is pecu liar to humanity itself'
(Nacorp 2008: 42). The areas of culrure, such as what is made by human
beings - focere does nor only take place in science - fo llow the Kamian
canonical distinction into epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. The
philosophy of culture, then, is the logic of each cultural formation,
where the transcendental method reconstructs the logics that produce
each cultural region. Such a particular logic can, tO Cohen, only reconstruct the logical structure of that cultural region, not irs empirical or
material elements. But just as in epistemology, rhe logical concepts underpinning ethics and law can only be derived from an existing science. The
paradigm of starring out, in each region, from the "factum of the sciences,"
means that in ethics one must start our from legal science, jurisprudence,
which is the point of crysraJi iz.arion of legal affairs. The grounding of
erhics, hence, can only occur through a reconstruction of the concepts
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and theories of an existing legal theory. Ideally, there is, as an ideal na tural
scien ce, an ideal legal science as factum chat is constantly under way, yet
with the status of its laws a nd proced ures as a priori.
Where it is plausible chat natural science works towards an ideal status,
such a claim might strike one as less than convincing in the realm of
jurisprudence. While Cohen might have had in mind a universal doctrine
of universal human rights, the re are undeniably very di fferent legal systems
based on differe nt legal traditions, which are unlikely ever to converge. Bur
the uanscendental method becomes even less con vincing when Cohen
declares that art history is the scientific facru m from whk h one has to de rive
the logic in the realm of aesthetics. Such a rathe r artifi cial approach raises
the question whether such a search for a logical structure starring fro m a
scientific factum can do justice to the wealth and multiplicity of culture.
W hen rhe Marburg School, hence, is chastised for having a "scientistic" or
"logicistic" outlook on culture, this critique is justified, the mome nt o ne
goes beyond a theory of scientific cognition. It is at this point that Cassirer
deparrs from h is reacher and moves into his own philosophy of culture,
centered on rhe concept of the symbolic.
From c ritical idealis m to symbolic idealism: the ubiquity
of the symbolic
Cassirer accepted Cohen's c ritical idealism with respect co the logic of
science, but clearly regarded this a pproach as inadequate when it came ro
cuJrure as a whole. This insight was itself reached, interestingly, in his early
work in the philosophy of science, Substance and Function, of 1910.
Cassirer's main philosophical con tribution after his historical work o n
the developme nt of modern science in Das Erkenntnisproblem (volumes 1
and JJ appeared in 1906 and 1907) was his recognition chat a profound
paradigm shift had occurred in modern science, more precisely in the
process of concept formation. Scie ntists, in a ntiquity, believed that concepts mi rrored things in the world. What unde rlay th is assumption, as well
as the concomitant conception of objects, was Aristotle's substance onrology. Accordingly, concepts were substance concepts. This Aristotelian
manner o f co ncept formatio n has endured into modernity. G radually,
however, this process was paralleled and subsequently replaced by a different one, which conforms to the "transcendental" reading of modern
science according to the Marburgers. Modern science has already been
performing the Copernican turn insofar as the theories are not read off of
the things (themselves) bur a re a rational c reation; they are what we lay inro
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nature through reason. Accordingly, concepts scientists use to express
lawful structures under which nature stands are memal creations, not
read off of substances "out there" (recall a concept such as "atom").
These concepts are themselves the reflection of a different ontology.
Such an ontology cannot be about substances existing independently of
us. Instead, things are what they are to us to the extent that we construct
them through our rational labor. This labor consists in the creation of
theories and, more essentially, concepts, which do not stand as substances
in and of themselves. Instead, concepts are relational, and the process of
concept formation in modern science is the creation of a string (Reihe) of
relations. Cassirer concludes his historical overview of this process:
Thus it becomes clear chat all concept-formation [in rhe new paradigm] is
bound to a certain Jmm of string-formation [Reihenbildung] . We call an
imuired manifold grasped and ordered conceptually when irs members do
nor srand alongside one another in isolation [bezielmngrlos], bur when ir comes
forth according ro a creative basic relation from a certain beginning member in
necessary relarion . . . according ro a principle. (Cassirer 1994b: 19f.)

This standing-in-relation accordjng ro a principle of order is captured in the
mathematical concept offunction,f(x). The concept in modern science is a
"mle for the connection of rhe individual" (Cassirer 1994b: 25), whereby the
"generality of a string-principle is the characteristic moment of the concept"
(Cassirer 1994b: 26). Gradually, in modern science, the "logic of the
mathematical functional principle" (Cassirer 1994b: 27) comes ro confront
and replace rhe concept of substance. The functional concept can also be
called a symbol:
The basic concepts of every science, rhe means by which it poses irs
questions and forms its solutions, no longer appear as passive representations
of a given emiry, bur as self-created imellecrual symbols. (Cassirer 1954: 1: 5)

To the extent that Cassirer explains the modern use of conceprs as formed
through a functional principle, rendering them symbols, he is adding
greater derail ro Cohen's basic doctrine. Bur Cassirer, by the time he has
developed his philosophy of the symbolic in the 1920s, goes beyond Cohen
and his own analysis of 1910 with the drum that this symbolism is at work
nor only in the realm of scientific cognition, bur in all functions of
"spiritual life." Spirirual life writ large is symbol-crearing, and the symbolic
is ubiqwrous:
Every genuine basic function of spirir has in common with cognition rhis
one rrair rhar an original-formative, nor jusr imirarive, power is inherenr in
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ir. The latter does nor just express passively what is there, bur conrains a
spiritual energy of its own through which simple enriries of intuition receive
a certain " meaning," a peculiar ideal conrenr. This goes for arras ir does for
cognition, for myth as well as religion. They all Live in peculiar image-worlds
in which nor merely somerhing empirically given mirrors irself, bur which
rhey produce according to an independent principle. Each oF rhem creates
irs own symbolic forms which are, nor identical co, bur in their own spiritual
origin on a par [ebmbtlrtig] wirh inrdlecrual symbols. (Cassirer 1954: 1: 9)

The ubiquiry of the symbolic, beyond scientific concept formation, is the
basic ide.a of d1e philosophy ofsymbolic forms. Cassirer's conception of rhe
symbol-creating spiritual energy is me antithesis of any representationalism,
according to which (as Rorty claims) me human mind is the mirror of
narure. ln Cassirer's use of me mirror image, me opposite holds; reality is the
mirror of rhe human mind, whkh is nor exhausted in producing cognition
alone. Cognition with its scientific memod is one form of spirirual energy;
oilier spiritual energies, those ar work in mym, religion, art, have their own
function al structures, generating their own symbolic forms. The task of
philosophy is ro perform me "transcendental method" on dlem, not in
Cohenian fashjon searching for each respective Factum of science, bur in
reconsrrucring the functional principle by which each spirirual energy creares
and shapes the functional nexus governing each form. This is a task philosophy can not do without leaning on empirical research in rhese different
areas, bur rhis is different from choosing a factum of science of mese cultural
realms for a reconstrucrion of their "logics." The functional principle at work
in different forms of culture cannot be reduced to a logic; "function"
displaces Cohen 's rigid concepcion of logic.
The term "spiri tual energy" is nor ro invoke some form of mysricism; it is
me result of a reconstruction starting regressively from me different spheres
of meaning mar an, myth, etc. are. They are rhe facta into whose "conditions
of possibility" must be inquired. But mese difterent spheres of meaning are
not simply there. T hey are created, they are the results of different types of
imuirion, of which Kanr merely discerned rhe abstract forms of space and
rime. Intuition is nor passively receiving bur actively forming. There is a
plurality of experiencing me world, and each rype of viewing sees something
differenr. Mythical space is different from me space of modern physics, as it
is different from the space of an or religion. This is nor an empirical
Statement abour the psychological capacities of me human species, but a
transcendental Statement concerning me cuJrure-formjng capacities of me
mind. Kant's Transcendental Aesthetics becomes pluralized, bur each
account of a pardcuJar intuition remains mereby transcendental, clarifying
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the constirucive principles governing each functional nexus. Cassirer illustrates this plurality of seeing with an example;
I grasp in [a serpentine line] rhe characrer of a cerrain omamem. which is
linked up for me with a cerrain arrisric meaning and an arristic
significatio7r ... Once again rhe form of rhe observation can change, insofar
as chat which at first presented irself ro me as a pure ornamenr, can reveal
irself as the bearer of a mythical-religious meaning .... And to this form of
seizing and internal acquisitio n we can juxtapose, with deliberare sharpness,
anorher one . .. While the aes thetically conremplaring and savoring individual gives himself over to the intuition of the pure form , where ro rhe
religiously touched person a mystical meaning is disclosed in rhis form; rhe
form thar stands before one's eyes can also serve for thought as an example
of a purely logical-conceprual srruccural nexus ... Where the aesthetical
direction of viewing perhaps saw Hogarth's Line of Beaucy, the mathemarician's gaze sees rhe image of a certain trigonometric funcrion, e.g., che
image of a sine curve, while the mathematical physicisr sees in rhe same
curve rhe law of a periodic wave. (Cassirer 2009b: 97f.)

The concrete task of rhe philosophy of the symbolic is to describe the
"symboUc logic" in each case of symboUc formation. An individual thing is
construed as a symbol; it makes sense only in a context of other things;
hence rhe symbol is the "throwing rogether" (sym-batlein) of the individual
and the general. Its meaning is contl!xtua/ and has a different meaning in
differenr symbolic gues. This a mounts to the universalization of Kant's
transcendental idealis m: the phenomenon becomes the symbo l, and to
account for it means co reconstruct the "logic," the funcrional principle in
each symbolic form. M yth , an, religion, science aiJ have rheir own structural principles a nd manners offuncrioning. 6 Thus we arrive, fro m critical
idealism, ar symbolic idealism.
The sum coral of these symbolic forms is cuJrure; it is the tota1icy of the
deeds on the part of humans, "for the con rent of the con cept of culture

can nor be isolared from the basic forms and directions of spirirua1 producing: 'being' is always only robe grasped in 'doing'" (Cassirer 1954: 1: 11).7
C ulture itself, then, is itself a fun ctional concept that can be defined only
th rough the deeds that bring it about, and not through a formal definjtion ,
which would render it a substantial "thing." This is why the philosophy of
the symbolic can neve r be a finished "system." Rather, the systematic
What they have in common is what one can call the triad of the symbolic: the function of impression,
expression, and presentation, but th~ functions work differemly in the different forms: $Ce Cusirer
:tQ09b: 7o--j.
" One ofCassirer's favorite authof'1 is Goo he. Recall that Faust rranslat~ "klgos· as "Tat" {deed): sec
Faust 1. v. t2J7.
h
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character of rhis philosophy must be demonstrated in rhe method of
reconstructing the fUnctional nexuses and in distinguishing the basic
nexuses from one another. T he concrete method of this philosophy is,
thus, phenomenological. 8
Cassirer was not able ro complete his "system, " since his Beeing from the
Nazis forced him co change plans for publish ing the Philosophy ofSymbolic
Fonns. After he had moved from Ger many to England, from there to
Sweden and finally to the United Stares, his relocations and encounters
with different intellectual milieus caused his interests co shift. His
philosophical plans were far from completed when he died in 1945. This
can be seen from the many additions an d novel ideas that Cassirer produces
after 1933. T here is no denying that Cassirer left many crirics wanting and
many questions unanswered. Cassirer never doubted the truth of the
projecr of a critique of culture as an analysis of rhe symbolic in irs manifold
expressions. By way of discussing some critical questions, I turn to the
metaphilosophicaJ significance of a critique of culture.
T he complementaristic plurality of culture and humanity's
self-liberation in culture
The purpose of the philosophy of symbolic for ms as a critique of culture is
ro give a rich accounr of the plural expressions of culture while keeping
such an account within the bou ndaries of transcendental philosophy. The
philosophy of symbolic forms is no empirical science, though it can and
must rely on material provided by scientific disciplines. One will never find
Cassirer discussing a problem without reference to scholarship; e.g., linguistics in the case of language, and anthropology in the case of mythical
consciousness. 9 However, the claim is a philosophical one, ro provide the
basic fu nctional structure ofeach symbolic fo rm, its particular logic, which
is the respective condi tion of the possibility of viewing, thereby creating,
the world, "irs" world. While there can be no sysrem that wouJd claim robe
complete - culture is an ever-evolvi ng process- the question remains, what
is rhe overall aim of this philosophy? !fir was said that the concrete method
is phenomenological (descriptive), one can point our that no descriptio n is

1

9

Cassiru off~mimes confinns his alliam:c wi1h ph~nomenology; 5« Cassirei 2009b: 7• 9S-99. For a
compuison ~~""~ffi Cassiru and Hu~rl s~ S. Luf1 Subj~ntlfil] and Lifro;()rld in Tra111undmwl
PIJmommolot:~ {Evanston: Nonhwestcrn University Press. lOll), 2)5- 266.
$~ C:mi rer 1979: 8o. "We havt- no o1h~r way to fi nd [the rul~ governing ncb fom1) th an 10 J>k 1he
sp« ial sciences. and we hav<' 10 accept the data wiLh which we arc provided by them ."
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naive and without presuppositions. What is, thus, the guiding clue underpinning Cassirer's analyses?
T he plurality and richness of culture cannot be subjected to che benchmark of science. Conversely, the philosophy of culture makes it clear mar a
merely empirical account of culture will not suffice, because such an
account is prone ro a cultural relativism. But what is me Status of the
symbolic forms themselves in the framework of a transcendental account?
I c is curious that Cassirer, when it comes to the number ofsymbolic forms,
rarely gives a "deduction" or a justification of why he mentions che ones he
does and not others. Moreover, his enumerations vary and sometimes
include other forms besides language, myrh, religion, arc, and cognition .
And it is even more curious ro note that he devotes systematic studies only
to language, myth, an d cognition, and in this o rder. What is th e rat ionale
for his procedure? Cassirer is nor consistent and fully clear here, and there is
no denying these systemat ic gaps.
Parr of this lack of fu !J exposi tion can be chalked up to Cassi rer's
inability co finish his philosophy due to his biography. The face that he is
not co nsistent in enumerating rhe symbolic forms - in later years, he
mentio ns technology and economy - can be countered by reminding us
of the functional nature of cuJ ture, that culture cannot be defined from
above and chat it is possible rhat new forms arise in the process of cuJ rure.
Indeed , such a discussion about the arrival of new forms of culture can
be an interesting exercise in cultural philosophy (is, fo r instance, che
Internet a new sym bolic form?). As he says, "human civilization n ecessarily creates new fo r ms, new symbols, new material things in which che
life of man finds irs external expression" (Cassirer 1979: 139). Bur there is
one importanc point where Cassirer's wavering gives rise to a mo re serious
co ncern.
On the one hand, Cassirer insists char he wants co give an account of the
richness of"spiritual activity" where each spiritual power has irs sui generis
"logic'' that cannot be compared co others, and ir would be a metabasis if
one symbolic form were measured by the standard of another (as Cohen
did when measuring all ocher forms with the standard of science). Thus,
the symbolic forms are irreducible co one another. The philosophy of
symbolic forms is an account of these symbolic forms without such an
overreaching from one form co another. They are, in this scenario, ordered
horizontally, displayi ng no hierarchy. Rather, they complement one
another, rogecher yielding a richer sense of culture (Cassirer quotes
H egel, das Ganze ist das Wahre). It is the cask of the philosophy of the
symbolic co "spell out of phenomena d ifferent symbols and, so co speak,
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different alphabets of thought that do not contradict each orher but
complete one another" (Cassirer 1979: 76).
On the other han d, statements as ro the relation of t he different forms ro
one anothe r in terms of a hierarchy are not absent. For one, Cassirer is
unfailingly dear on one poim, the system atic locus of myth. Myth is the
first form of spiritual and cultural development, which is primitive (though
not irrational) and is overcome through higher forms of cult ural expression.
Religion, language, and science "conquer" myth and relegate it ro a form of
unenlightened pre-culm ral existence. It is a stage of human development to
which one may not return in a developed culture. T he fact that myth is
made to re-enter the arena of culture is his critique of modern fascism
(cf. Cassirer 1946). T his marks him as standing in the traditio n of the
Enlightenment. Conversely, Cassirer speaks of science as the highest
expression of human spirit and as the purpose and end-goal of culture.
While all symbolic forms "possess their own dis£inc tive type of 'universal
validity' ... the clearest and best example of such ' u niversal validity'
continues, in good Marburg sryle, ro be given by the language of mathem atical exact science. "' 0 These passages make him vulnerable to the charge
that despite the emphasis on a ll cultural forms being equal, they are, at the
end of the day, subordinate ro scientific theory and irs logical ideal of
universal validity in a lingua zmiversa/is, and to the critique that he remains
aloofly disrespectful of o ur facticiry and our fi nitude. In t his way, one may
summarize H eidegger's position against Cassirer during the Oavos
standoff.
There is, as mentioned, no denying that one finds conflicting passages in
this respect. A solutio n can only be ro spell our wha t Cassirer should have
unambiguomly said in light of this conuadiction . Should scientific conduct
be inrerpreted as the highest form of human culture? Surely a scientific
positivism o r unal loyed belief in scientific progress is not Cassirer's sentiment. Despite his admi ration for modern science, and his inrimate knowledge thereof, Cassirer is nonetheless more aptly placed on the
"humanistic" side of the "two culrures." Or perhaps better, Cassirer's
position is best described as "syn thetic" in wanting ro do justice ro borh
traditions, in that the humanistic aspect of cultu re should not be left
unaccounrable ro reason and rational critique, and in that natural-scientific
reason should not operate in rhe way of a cold-hearted technology.
Thus, while the philosophy of cu lture was described as proceeding by a
10

M. Friedman , A f'arting of rh~ Wap: Ctrrnap. Cllltiru , and
1000) , 15 2 .

H~id~gga (Chic:~go:

Open Courr,

SEBASTIAN LUFT

descriptive method, the normative aspect of critique must not be overlooked. To subject culture ro critique, then, must not be understood in the
way of a cold rational look at culture, and hence the excl usive search for
logical structures, bur in the way in which Narorp describes rationali ty, as
answering ro the deepest questions of manki nd.
The "critique of culcure" may rh us not be seen as the call tO rationally
"scan " rhe different cultural forms as ro their "deep" rational structures.
Rather, what must be emphasized is that culture is the correlate of the
common humanity that unites us; in all cultural forms we find " ultimately
the 'sa me' human being that we always continual ly encounter in the
development of culture, in thousands of manifestations a nd in thousands
of masks." 11 This insight amounts to acknowledging the emnncipatory
power of cuhure as the self-liberation of the human being in and through
c ulture. The task of rhe critique of culture is to make understandable char
culture, in all of its forms (starting centrifugally from myth), is the gradual
acquisition of freedom. T his critique " rejects the conception that mind
submits ro an outward fa te. Mind must realize and actualize its own
freedom in order ro possess it, and the whole work of culture is this very
process ofself- realization" (Cassirer t979: 89). Yet, mind is to be found, not
in an absolute state, bur in the refractions of the various fo rms of culture,
which a re forms of our own making and spaces where alone we can be
human beings. Thus, the description of the symbolic forms is at the same
dme a prescription of the common core of humanity to which we all ought
to belong. The animal rationale is, thus, defined in a more encompassing
sense as animal symbolicum and the ethical ideal of this vision is that
freedom can only be obtained in culture; that culture is nor the inhibitor
of freedom, but its condition of possibility. Cassirer ch aracterizes tbe
" promise and hope" (1979: 90) of the distinctly Marburg-infused philosophy of culture rhus:
It hopes co come co a sorr of grammar and synrax of che human mind, co a
survey of irs various forms and functions, and ro an insight into rhose
general rules by which they are governed. By this we may be able co understand in a better way the koinon kosmon ofhumaniry, char common world in
which each individual consciousness participates and which it has co reconstruct in irs own way and by irs own efforts. (Cassirer 1979: 89)

The philosophy of culture, rhus, has no task over and above rhis realizadon, it is nor a symbolic form of irs own, bur it is the logic of the symbolic

" Quoted in Friedman, A Paning oftbl' WaJ!. 154.
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in its richness of expression. It makes us understand that there is nor and
ought nor ro be any life outside of culture, and that culture is both our
space and ours ro create responsibly.
Conclusion. The legacy of Marburg: the collaboration
of philosophy and science; the emancipatory function of culture
Regarding the legacy of the Marburg School, let me mention one aspect in
conclusion, where [ believe irs efforts bear resemblance to some of roday's
philosophical concerns.
Let me return to the critique of philosophy as rhe "handmaiden of
the sciences." The critique consists in the claim that, with this allencompassing ideaJ of culture and the insistence that philosophy cannot
do without the individuaJ sciences deaJing with the differem forms of
culruraJ expression, philosophy is indeed relegated ro nothing other than
the former's handmaiden. I think it is fair to say that many contemporary
philosophers would bristle ar this notion of philosophy. fn order to
correctly assess what philosophy is to accomplish, one can compare the
Marburg School with another form of Neo-Kantianism, namely Robert
Brandom's inferentialism. I cannot delve deeper into one of the most
impressive philosophies of our day, nor do 1 claim that Brandom is the
only contemporary phiJosopher who could serve as example here. r only
wish to point our one contemporary parallel to the Marburg position.
In phjlosophy's task of "making explicit" the discursive commitmems
we undertake when we engage in the "social ·pracrices of giving and asking
for reasons" (Brandom 2001: 92), Brandom rejects the role of philosophy as
being the "queen of the sciences" ("philosophy is at most a queen of the
sciences, nor the queen" (93)). Indeed, philosophy plays no "foundational
role with respect ro other disciplines" (ibid.) and in this sense, Brandom
expressly embraces the image of rhe "handmaiden" (ibid.), and he describes
the task of philosophy as follows:
For what we do char has been misundersrood as having foundational or
methodological significance is to provide and apply tools for unpacking the
substantive commirmenrs char are implicit in the concepts deployed
throughout rhe culture, including the specialired disciplines of the high
culcure. Making those norms and inferences explicit in rhe form of claims
exposes them for the first rime ro reasoned assessmenr, challenge, and
defense, and so to the sort of rational emendation that is the primary process
of conceprual evolution. But once rhe implicit presuppositions and
consequences have been brought out inro the daylight of explicitness, the
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process of assessment, emendation, and evolution is the business of chose
whose concepts they are, and nor somethi ng philosophers have any authoricy over or expertise regarding. (Brandom 1.001: 92-93)
This definition of rhe rask of philosophy has interesting similarities wirh
that of the Marburg School. The Marburgers would agree that ph ilosophy
can not, and should not, provide an ultimate fow1darion , ir cannot be
" first" philosophy, since it canno t make itself independe nt of the sciences
which cUscover the concepts and functions of the regions they are sciences
of. As Cohen says, philosophy is no Gnmdlngenwisumchnfi, a scie nce of
foundations. Bur as handmaide n, it also develops the tools fo r "ratio nal
emenda tion," which precisely is c ritique, bur necessarily critique ofsomerhing rhar functions implicitly th rough norms, and this is culture. Directly
addressing the issue of whether philosoph y is the torch- o r train-bearer of
the sciences, Cassirer maintains that the re can be a third alternative.
Philosophy's task can nor consist in
mediating the inner battles rhar always again arise in science and co silence
them through hasty solutions. Rarher, it stands in the midst of rhese bardes,
it cannor and wishes nor to be anything bm rhe fellow combatant
[Mimr~ilt'rin) in these. I nsread of overcoming rhe opposirions rhrough rhe
command of thought or arrempcing to reconcile them through a mere
comprom ise, it must rarher make rhese visible in rheir full serio usness and
graviry. (Cassirer 2004: 358)

As combatant in these banles, philosophy equally has the cask of making
explicit rhe functional principles guiding rhe symbolic fo rms, which is nor
somethi ng individual sciences can do on rheir own, bur which is nor something entirely above and beyond rhem e ither. P hilosophy merely has the task
of making explicit whar goes on implicitly in the culrural activities. What is
m ade explicit in the essentially self-reflective intellectual acriviry philosophy
is rhe fact that culture is the expressio n of rhe common humani ry char we

share. Surely, the philosophy ofsymbolic forms "makes [hings explicir" in its
own m a nner, as explained in chis essay, b u r in this division-of-labor concept
of philosophy, "Marburg" bears striking s im ilarity to " Pittsb urgh ." But
understood in the right way, this is noc a reproach chat should pur philosophers working in chis mode on the defensive. Instead, it is rhe healthy
balance any philosophy must mike when it acknowled ges that it cannot
o perate in a vacuum bur in a culture rich wirh creative work, pan of which is
carried out in the sciences, while nor ceding irs position to na turalism .
The moraL demand is that this process of culrure becomes everexpanded, keeping barbarism at bay, while knowing char the human
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being is a "crooked piece of t imber" that can never be made straigh t.
Emancipation fro m "self-incurred rutelage" can only come through
partaking in culrure, which is nor anybody's private achievement, bur the
product of "spirit." Thus, rhe M arburg School situates icself, in Cassirer,
consciously berween Kant and Hegel.

